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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN B. YEATES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.ARCHIE L. BUDGE,
Defendant and Respondent.
and
ARCHIE L. BUDGE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Appeals No's.
7851-7852

-vs.MRS. JOHN B. YEATES,
Defendant and Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
These appeals involve merely a factual question.
We, therefore, deem it advisable to make our own Statement of Facts.
The original typewritten transcript of the proceedings prepared by the reporter is filed as a part of the
record in Case No. 7482 in the lower court. A typewritten
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copy of the reporter's transcript of the proceedings was
filed in Case No. 7475 in the lower court. Both transcripts are a part of the record on appeal. The proceedings are, of course, identical in each case because the two
cases were consolidated for trial. H'Owever, the official
paging appearing at the bottom of the transcript varies
in the two transcripts because of difference in the number
of pages in the pleadings in the two cases. The reporter's
page numbering of both transcripts appears in the upper
right hand corner of each transcript and this paging is
identical in both cases. We will, therefore, foHow the
practice of appellants' counsel and in all references to
testimony in our brief the same is to the page numbering
of the reporter appearing in the upper right hand corner
of each transcript.
The actions in connection with which these appeals
have been taken arose out ·of an automobile accident that
occurred on September 11, 1951, (R. 3), at approximately
6:00 P.M., (R. 4), just south of the Logan City Limits.
Counsel for the appellant throughout his brief refers to
Utah Highway No.1 which runs from the Idaho line south
through Logan and thence south to Wellsville through
the State of Utah. This highway, except to counsel, is
commonly known and also formally designated by appropriate markers as U. S. Highway 91 and is the main
highway proceeding north and south through the State
of Utah, (R. 6, 94). According to Section 36-6-12 Utah
C'Ode Annotated, Utah State Highway No. 101 runs from
Logan southerly via Hyrum to Wellsville. U. S. Highway
91 proceeds in a general northerly and southerly direcSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion through Logan, Utah, and just south of the City
Limits of Logan said F. S. Highway 91 curves to the
west. ~\t this point said F tah State Highway No. 101
proceed:5 in a southeasterly direction fron1 said U. S.
High\vay 91. The junction of said Utah State Highway
with said r. S. Highway 91 forms an almost perfect
''1''. X orth of the said junction said lJ. S. Highway 91
is a ±lane paved road. As said l-:-. S. Highway 91 curves
to the west south of said junction it narrows to a 2 lane
paved road. Utah State Highway No. 101 is merely a 2
lane paved road. There is a stop sign on the east side
of said Utah State Highway 101 at its junction with said
r. S. Highway 91 requiring traffic on said State Highway K o. 101 to stop prior to entering said U. S. Highway
91. The physical facts and the manner in which said highways come together were all indicated on a blackboard
drawing made by State Highway Patrolman Roland
Reese which drawing has been copied by the reporter and
reproduced at R. 117. While there is no designation on
the map to indicate directions, the top of the map indicates south and the bottom of the map indicates north,
(R. 4). The speed limit along U. S. Highway 91 at the
scene of the accident is 35 miles per hour and was so
posted at the time of the accident, (R. 33).
The accident occurred on a clear day, (R. 10), with
no obstruction to vision, (R. 11).
Mrs. John B. Yeates was driving a 1946 Ford vehicle
which was owned by her husband, (R. 4, 19), and was
proceeding south from Logan en route to Hyrum, Utah,
(R. 8). Archie L. Budge was driving his 1948 Nash autoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mobile, (R. 70), in a northerly direction along U. S.
Highway 91, (R. 9, 63). The 2 cars were thus approaching the "Y" from opposite directions.
Mrs. Yeates testified that as she approached the
"Y" she was traveling at a speed of approximately 25
miles per hour, (R. 7, 8, 9), and that Budge was traveling
at a medium rate of speed, neither fast nor slow, (R. 14).
When she was up by the bridge some distance north of the
"Y" she was traveling in the far west lane for southbound
traffic on said U. S. Highway 91. At that time she signaled with her hand to change lanes and proceeded into the
inside lane for southbound traffic next to the center line
so that she could make a left turn at the junction onto
the Nibley-Hyrum road, (R. 16). She testified that when
she first observed the Budge car it was coming north
on its own side of the road, (R. 16), and was then about
a length or a length and a half of the court room from
her, (R. 9); that there were no obstructions to her vision,
(R. 11). Point A was designated on the blackboard map,
(R. 117), as the point where U. S. Highway 91 and Utah
State Highway 101 come together. According to Mrs.
Yeates when she was about 100 or more feet north of
Point A, Budge was just about at Point A, (R. 57-58).
Mrs. Yeates testified that she had driven over the
road a number of times, (R. 15), and knew it was a dangerous intersection, (R. 19); that she knew there was
a stop sign requiring traffic as it came north along the
Nibley road to stop, (R. 15). She testified that she knew
that the Budge car was going to continue north into LoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gan as there was no other way for it to go, (R. 21, 24,
25).
(By ilir. Strong) ~Irs. Yeates, when you
first saw the Budge vehicle there was no
doubt in your n1ind as to the course it was
going to take and that it was coming straight
into Logan, was there~
A. \Yell, I guess that's right. (R. 24)
Q. You knew that was the only road it could

··Q.

take~

A.
Q.

Surely.
And you knew what road it was going to take
when you first saw it~
A. Yes. (R. 25)"
When she was about the length of the court room
away from the Budge vehicle she applied her brakes, (R.
19), because she didn't know whether she could proceed
safely in front of it. At this time she had not yet crossed
over the center line of the highway, (R. 16, 20).

"Q.
A.

So that when you were about the length of
this room away you applied your brakes~
Yes, sir. (R. 20).

* * * *
Q. At that time you didn't know whether you
A.

could safely proceed across in front of this
Budge car~
That's right. (R. 20).

* * * *
Q.

But while they were applied (meaning the
brakes) you turned across the double center
line into the lane for northbound traffic~
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A.

Yes.

(R. 21).

* * * *
Q. Well, that's what you did though, isn't iU
You did turn over the double center line into
the lanes of northbound traffic with your
brakes on~
A. But that put me in my own lane.
Q. Put you over the double center line, didn't
it~

A.

Yes, and on my own road going to Nibley.
(R. 22) ."

She admitted that she had not signaled her intention
of turning from Highway 91 onto the Nibley-Hyrum
·road, (R. 16, 17, 95).
She testified that the front end of her car practically back to the windshield was over the center line of
the highway at the time of the impact, (R. 18, 19). She
admitted that there was no other traffic in front of her
on her side of the road in the immediate vicinity of the
accident, (R. 21).
She testified that the right front of her car and the
left front of the Budge vehicle collided, (R. 23); that at
the time of the impact she was practically stopped, although her car could have been somewhat in motion, (R.
23).
Mrs. Yeates testified that she expected Budge· to pass
to the rear or west of her car, (R. 27), notwithstanding
the fact that the front end of her car at that tune was
over the center line of the highway and the rear of her car
was at least partially in the inside lane of south bound
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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traffic. on Highway ~) 1. ( R. :28). She further ad1ni tted that
she turned the ~teering wheel of her car to the left before
the impact, (R. 30-31).
Archie L. Budge testified that when he passed the
35 mile speed limit sign about a block southwest of the
"1,'' he reduced his speed to 35 miles per hour and slowed
down to about 30 miles per hour as he approached the
"1," (R. 53); that he first observed the Yeates vehicle
when it was about 500 feet away, (R. 75) ; that it was
traveling in the lane next to the eenter line, (R. 46-47),
with no other vehicles at that time on the road between
the two ears; that he continued ahead beeause there was
no indication that the Yeates car was going to cross into
his lane of traffic., (R. 47); that when the two vehicles
were about 25-30 feet apart Mrs. Yeates started to turn
abruptly into his lane of traffic. and without signalling
her intention so to do, (R. 48, 65); that he applied his
brakes and turned to the right, (R. 65); that he didn't
have time to turn to the left or rear of the Yeates car and
that this in any event would have plaeed him on the wrong
side of the road, (R. 48). According to Budge Mrs.
Yeates was traveling about 25-30 miles per hour and he
thought she picked up speed as she turned in front of
him, (R. 66). Folowing the aeeident,'Mrs. Yeates said:
"I just don't know what happened," (R. 67).
There were four passengers in the Budge vehicle,
all of whom testified at the trial. Ivan Peterson, one of
the passengers, stated that Budge slowed down as heapproaehed the intersection and was not traveling over
30 miles per hour at the "Y," (R. 82); that he observed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Yeates car traveling down the highway on its own
side of the road until it got within 25-30 feet of them
when it made a quick left turn, (R. 83) ; that Budge turned to the right and applied his brakes, (R. 83) ; that Mrs.
Yeates gave no signal, (R. 83); that there was no danger
or warning until Mrs. Yeates made the abrupt left turn,
(R. 84); that in his opinion Mrs. Yeates was traveling at
a speed of about 30 miles per hour as she made the turn,
(R. 84).
\Villiam Royce King, another passenger in the Budge
vehicle, testified that they were not going fast and were
traveling under 30 miles per hour as they approached
the "Y," (R. 88); that Mrs. Yeates was traveling in the
lane immediately to the right of the center line but made
an abrupt left turn just a split second in front of the
Budge car, (R. 89), when the Budge vehicle was about
30-40 feet away, (R. 92); that the accident occurred
about 3 or 4 feet east of the center of the highway, (R.
91); that until Mrs. Yeates made her abrupt left turn
he thought she was going to continue on Highway 91,
(R. 93).
William B. Smith, another passenger in the Budge
vehicle, stated that as the Budge car entered the intersection it was traveling at a speed of about 20-25 miles
per hour, (R. 103); that when the Yeates car got within
20-30 feet of them Mrs. Yeates without signaling (R. 106),
whipped sharply in front of them like she was going to
make a U turn and at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour,
(R. 102).
Leatham MacNiel, another passenger in the Budge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vehicle, testified that they were traveling at a moderate
rate of speed, (R. 108); that when he first observed the
Yeates car it was in the inside lane cOining straight down
the road but that when it got within 25-30 feet of them it
made a quick left turn in front of them, (R. 108) ; that
:Jir. Budge then turned to the right, (R. 108).
Paul \Y. Hurd was driving a northbound vehicle on
Highway 91 and had been traveling ahead of the Budge
vehicle. He observed the Yeates car coming south on
Highway 91 at a speed of about 35 miles per hour. He
looked back over his shoulder and observed the Yeates
car about at the time of the impact with the car about onehalf a car length across the center ~f the highway, (R.
96). He testified that he had been traveling at a speed
of 27-28 miles per hour and that Budge had not been
gaining on him, (R. 97).
.
Roland Reese, the State Highway Patrolman who
investigated the accident, (R. 32), testified that when he
arrived on the scene the Yeates car was headed almost
due east, (R. 42), with its front wheels 21 feet west of
the east edge of the paved road and its rear wheels 26
feet east of the west edge of the paved road, (R. 37, Ex.
1); that the oiled portion of U. S. Highway 91 at this
point was 60 feet in width, (R. 38) ; that he observed 37
feet of brake marks from the Yeates car, (R. 35) ; that
these brake marks at their north end started about on the
line separating the two lanes for southbound traffic, (R.
38, 40, 41). Patrolman Reese also testified that the Budge
vehicle laid down 41 feet of brake marks, (R. 34), and
traveled 13 feet after the impact, (R. 34, 35). Patrolman
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Reese testified that he drew a map showing the physical
facts as he found them on the scene right after the accident and before either car had been moved, (R. 39). This
map was received in evidence as defendant's Exhibit
No. 1. He testified that the diagram, Exhibit 1, had been
drawn by him to show the situation on the highway as he
found it immediately following the accident and that the
diagram clearly showed the cars and the marks as good
as an amateur could make it, (R. 39). He testified that
from his observation the front wheels of the Yeates car
at the time of the accident were about 9 feet over the
double center line, (R. 42).
With reference to the skid marks testified to by the
patrolman, Mr. Budge stated that his marks were not
skid marks but merely tire marks, (R. 78). He also
testified that the length of his car was 18-20 feet, (R. 97);
that he was present when the officer measured the skid
marks and that they included the total length without
any allowance for the wheel base and that the length of
his car would, therefore, have to be subtracted, (R. 98).
Mr. MacNiel testified that the measurements of brake
marks from both, cars were made from the point of
impact on the front of each car and therefore the marks
included the front wheels; that the length of car, therefore, would have to be subtracted to determine the actual
braking distance ; and that by doing so these marks
would indicate that the two vehicles were about 40 feet
apart when the brakes on both were first applied, (R. 112,
113).
Archie L. Budge sued Mrs. John B. Yeates for perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sonal injuries and for damages to his vehicle, (Budge,
R. 1), and :Jirs. Yeates counterclaimed in this action for
alleged personal injuries (Budge, R. 2). John B. Yeates
as owner of the vehicle operated by his wife filed a
separate snit against Archie L. Budge to recover damages to his auton1obile (Yeates, R. 1). Both cases were
consolidated for trial and tried before the Judge without a jury, the Judge in both cases, therefore, acting
as trier of the facts.
The court found that ~Irs. Yeates was negligent in
turning left across the center of the highway into the
path of the Budge car when it was so close as to constitute a hazard and without keeping a proper lookout,
and that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident, (R. 6-7 Yeates case) (R. 5 Budge case).
_Mrs. Yeates counterclaim was dismissed, (R. 59) (Budge
R. 7). A judgment of no cause of action was rendered
in the Yeates case against Budge (Yeates R. 9), and a
judgment in favor of Budge was entered in his case
against Yeates, (Budge R. 7). The only question involved in these appeals is whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the court in its finding that Mrs.
Yeates' negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
POINT
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASES SUPPORTS THE
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

ARGUMENT
There is no dispute that this accident occurred at an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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intersection. Counsel for the appellants, however, takes
the position that Mrs. Yeates was not making a left turn
at the intersection. He bases this on the claim that Mrs.
Yeates was allegedly on Highway 101 as well as U. S.
Highway 91 before reaching the junction after leaving
Logan and that she continued on that highway and by
reason of this she was not turning left but in fact continuing straight ahead. As a matter of fact, the HyrumNibley Road does not commence and is not even designated except at the point of its junction with U. S. Highway 91 and south thereof. In any event, an examination
of the reproduction of the patrolman's map (R. 117)
shows that Mrs. Yeates would have to turn left to reach
the Hyrum-Nibley Road. Mrs. Yeates herself testified
that she did turn left and that the front end of her car
back to the windshield was across the double center line
of Highway 91 at the time of the accident. In response to
a direct question asked her by the court she admitted
that she actually turned the steering wheel of her car
to the left. Under such circumstances it is difficult to
understand how counsel could decide that Mrs. Yeates
was not making a left turn.
Section 57-7-78 (ii), Utah Code Annotated 1943,
defines an intersection as follows:
"Intersection." The area embraced within
the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb
lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines
of the roadways of two highways which join one
another at, or approximately at, right angles, or
the area within which vehicles traveling upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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different highways joining at any other angle
come in conflict..,
Section 57-7-137, Utah Code Annotated 1943, controls the rights of motorists turning at an intersection
and provides as follows:
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is within the intersection
or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate
hazard, but said driver, having so yielded and
having given a signal when and as required by
this act, may make such left turn and the drivers
of all other vehicles approaching the intersection
from said opposite direction shall yield the rightof-way to the vehicle making the left turn."
We believe that these sections of the Utah statute
are controlling and decisive of the facts and issues in
the case. Under them there can be no question that Mrs.
Yeates was in fact making a left turn.
In these cases the court was sitting as trier of the
facts. It weighed all of the evidence before it and concluded that the negligence of Mrs. Yeates in making a
left turn in front of the Budge vehicle when it was so
close as to constitute a hazard was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. The decision of the trial court
must be upheld if there is any evidence to support it.
We believe that the evidence in this case not only supports the court's decision, but under the testimony no
other reasonable decision was possible.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
There was evidence from which the court could have
found that :Mrs. Yeates while traveling at a speed of
20-30 miles an hour south along U.S. Highway 91 made
an abrupt left turn without signal or warning across
the double center line at a time when the Budge vehicle
was within 25 or 30 feet of her; that at the time of the
impact the front end of the Yeates car back to the windshield was over the double center line; that the right
front of the Yeates vehicle and the left front of the Budge
vehicle collided.
The undisputed evidence in the case was that the
speed limit on U. S. Highway 91 at the scene of the
accident was 35 miles per hour. No one testified that
Budge was traveling in excess of that speed. Even Mrs.
Yeates described his speed as moderate. Under such
circumstances it is difficult to support the court's finding
that Budge was traveling at an excessive rate of speed,
but nonetheless, under the facts above mentioned, Budge's
speed could not be a proximate contributing cause to the
accident. Mrs. Yeates admittedly gave no warning signal
of any type for her left turn and until her vehicle crossed
over the double center line there was nothing to indicate
to the defendant that she was going to turn left onto the
Hyrum-Nibley Road. Since she was then within 25-30
feet of the Budge vehicle and since the court could have
found that both vehicles at that time were traveling at
a speed of 20-30 miles per hour, an accident was inevitable regardless of the speed at which Budge was traveling. In fact, Mrs. Yeates felt at the time she turned left
there was going to be an accident (R. 34), and she was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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still on her side of the road, but notwithstanding her
feeling, continued across the double center line into the
path of the oncon1ing Budge car.
Whether Budge's speed was excessive under the circumstances, and if so, whether it was a proximate cause
of the accident was a question of fact to be decided by
the court sitting as trier of the facts. See 5 Am. Jur.
P. 882, Sec. 689, where it is said:

"* * * It is generally for the jury to decide
·whether the speed of the vehicle proximately contributed to the accident, and whether such speed
was excessive, considering in connection therewith the hazards of the surrounding circumstances."
See also to the same effect 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia
of Automobile Law and Practice, Part 1, P. 662 Sec.
6607, where it is said:
"Speed in excess of that permitted by statute,
ordinance, or other traffic regulation may constitute negligence per se; nevertheless there is
still a jury question as to whether or not such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury
or damage complained of."
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice, Part 2, P. 111, Sec. 2611, which reads
as follows:
"It is usually a question for the jury whether
an excessive rate of speed is a contributing cause
of an accident, so it has been held a question for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the jury whether the violation of an ordinance
limiting the speed of vehicles in crossing a main
thoroughfare was the proximate cause of a collision of plaintiff's automobile with a telephone
pole."
See Frakes vs. Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. (Kansas), 84 Pac. (2d) 871. In that case the defendant argued,
as appellant's counsel does here, that since the jury found
the plaintiff was guilty of traveling at a speed in excess
of that provided by statute, that as a matter of law the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The court held
that this did not follow because it was still for the jury
to determine whether the speed was a proximate contributing cause of the accident. The jury did not so find
and the appellate court upheld its decision.
See also Bennis vs. Young (Calif.), 20 Pac. (2d)
111, wherein there was evidence that both cars involved
in the accident were exceeding the speed limit, but the
jury found that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and the appellate court
sustained the verdict.
See also to the same effect Larsen vs. Webb (Miss.),
58 S.W. (2d) 967, holding that negligence of a plaintiff
in exceeding a statutory speed limit would not defeat
his recovery unless such negligence was a proximate contributing cause to the accident.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Martin vs.
Stevens, decided May 1, 1952, and reported at 243 Pac.
( 2d) 747, has held that even though there was evidence
of negligence on the part of plaintiff, that it was noneSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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theless for the jury under all of the evidence to determine whether that negilgence was a proximate cause
of the accident or whether the defendant's negligence
wa~ the proxi1nate cause of the accident. In the case at
bar the court was 8itting as trier of the facts and found
that the negligence of :Jirs. Yeates was the proximate
cause of the accident. The court as trier of the facts
was, therefore, doing what the Utah Supreme Court in
the J!artin vs. Ste~·ens case held was its proper function
under disputed issues of negligence and contributory
negligence.
Counsel for appellants in his brief argues that
Budge should have passed to the rear or left of the
Yeates vehicle and that he was negligent in not so doing.
He relies on Section 57-7-130 (b), Utah Code Annotated
1943, which, among other things provides :

"Whenever pra.cticable a left turn shall be
made in that portion of the intersection to the left
of the center of intersection."
We refer the court to the reporter's copy of the
patrolman's diagram found at R. 142 for the purpose of
determining whether counsel's contention in this regard
is sound. Car No. 2 as indicated on the diagram shows
the position of the Yeates vehicle across the double center
lines. However, as testified to by Mrs. Yeate~, only the
front portion of the car back to the windshield was over
the double center lines. The diagram conclusively shows
that it would not have been practicable or safe for Budge
to have passed to the left or the rear of the Yeates
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vehicle. This would have placed him entirely on the
wrong side of the road and into the lanes for southbound
traffic. He turned right when Mrs. Yeates made her
abrupt left turn across the center line when he was only
25-30 feet away and we submit that this was the only
safe thing for him to do. In fact, according to Budge
and all of the passengers in his vehicle there was no
time to turn left in view of the suddeness with which
Mrs. Yeates turned in front of them.
Counsel for appellant in his brief refers to the
brake marks from each of the vehicles as testified to by
Patrolman Reese and argues that according to the brake
marks the two vehicles were 78 feet apart since there
were 37 feet of brake marks from the Yeates car before
the impact and 41 feet of brake marks from the Budge
car. However, it is undisputed by other testimony that
the patrolman measured to the front wheels of each
vehicle at the point of impact and that accordingly in
order to determine the actual braking distance of each
car the length of each vehicle would have to be subtracted. Budge testified that his vehicle was about 18-20
feet in length and the length of the Yeates car would,
of course, be about the same. Subtracting the lengths of
the two vehicles from their respective brake marks, this
would indicate that the two vehicles were actually 38-42
feet apart when the brakes on each were first applied.
There was evidence that the two vehicles at that time
were traveling at a speed of 20-30 miles per hour. The
patrolman's drawing of Mrs. Yeates brake marks, (Exhibit 1), indicates that the Yeates vehicle proceeded at
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about a -15 degree angle from a point near the outside
lane across the center line. It can thus readily be seen
that ~Irs. Yeates did turn abruptly in front of the Budge
car and when it was too close for Budge to avoid an
accident. Her negligence under such circumstances was
the proximate cause of the entire accident.
~Irs. Yeates knew the course that the Budge vehicle
was going to take because it was the only road which
it could take. Notwithstanding this, she turned directly
into the course that she knew the Budge vehicle would
take. She created the hazard by turning into the path
of the Budge vehicle and without giving any proper
signal of her intention of so doing. She appreciated
the danger while she was still on her own side of the
road because when she first applied the brakes her vehicle
was on its side of the road and near the line dividing the
two lanes for southbound traffic. She felt then that an
accident was going to occur and yet continued turning
directly into the path of the oncoming car. She could
have avoided the accident by continuing on her own side
of the road to the left of the center line because, as she
admitted, there were no other southbound vehicles in the
immediate vicinity and nothing to have prevented her
from so doing. The diagram prepared by Patrolman
Reese at the time of the original investigation immediately following the accident indicates that the Yeates vehicle
made a sharp turn and from the outside lane and at
almost a 45 degree angle directly into the path of the
Budge car, (Exhibit 1).
We believe that the reasoning of this court in the
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cases of Cederlof ·vs. Whited, 169 Pac. (2d) 777, French
vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 216 Pac. (2d) 1002, and Hardman vs. Thurman, 239 Pac. (2d) 215, is a complete answer
to the position taken by the appellants in these cases.
While the Cederlof case did not occur at an intersection, the question there was whether the defendant's
negligence in making the left turn was the sole proximate
cause of the accident or whether there was evidence from
which the jury might find that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence in causing the accident. The
court in that case points out that the jury could have
found that the defendant made the turn very slowly in
accordance with his testimony, or could have found
that he did not slow down but turned suddenly into the
plaintiff's lane of traffic. This is exactly the situation in
our case. Mrs. Yeates testified that she made the turn
very slowly, but in such event Budge would have been
justified in assuming that since her brakes were applied
she had seen his approach and was going to allow his
car to pass before proceeding across his lane. If, on the
other hand, the court believed the other testimony that
Mrs. Yeates did not slow down, then, as indicated by this
court in the Cederlof case, the result would still have
been the same and the negligence of Mrs. Yeates would
still be the sole proximate cause of the accident. In both
the Cederlof case and the French case the court indicated
that after all the one making the left turn has control
of the situation. He knows when he is going to turn, but
the opposing driver must discover it and even where the
approaching driver is coming too rapidly, the left turn
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drivers must take that into consideration. In the cases
at bar :Jlr:::;. Yeates knew the course that the Budge
vehicle wa:::; going to take, but Budge could not, of course,
know \Vhich road she wa:::; going to take. She did not
signal and gaYe him no warning of her turn until it was
too late for him to avoid the accident. Furthermore, she
knew the speed at which the Budge vehicle was being
operated and had appreciated the danger by applying
her brakes while still on her side of the road, but then
she turned directly across the center line into the path
of the Budge car when she could have avoided the accident in its entirety by remaining on her own side of the
road.
The Hardman vs. Thurman case merely held that the
questions of negligence and contributory negligence in a
left turn case were questions of fact for the jury. In
the cases at bar the court was sitting as trier of the facts.
The case is, therefore, stronger than either the Cederlof
case or the French case and comes directly within the
rule announced in the Hardman vs. Thurman case. The
court sitting as trier of the facts resolved the issues in
the favor of Budge and we submit under the evidence
there was ample to support the court in so finding.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judgment of the lower court in both cases should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG and
DALE T. BROWNING,
Attorneys for Respondent
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